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LAW NOTES
CUSTOM AND USAGE IN CONTRACTS
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
In an early South Carolina case Justice Johnson of the
Court of Appeals discussed the growth of the effect of cus-
tom and usage in the history of jurisprudence. He observed
that the law merchant was originally made up for the most
part of rules framed and acted upon by the merchants for
their convenience, which, with the sanction of the Courts,
became the law of the land; it is from this source that rules
for interpretation of mercantile contracts were principally
derived. "Every trade, art, and profession has a language in
some degree peculiar to itself, and it is only by reference to
the general understanding of those who are accustomed to
use it, that we arrive at the meaning."1 An example of these
unique rules was the old usage of allowing days of grace for
payment of bills of exchange, such practice having since been
changed by the enactment of the Negotiable Instrument Law.
Although these customs and usages which have risen to suit
new sources of enterprise and trade have not the force of law
until they have received the sanction of the courts of justice,
they are received as evidence to explain what was meant
by the contracting parties.
2
This note is intended to be a general survey of the South
Carolina contract cases involving custom and usage, their es-
sential elements and their operation and effect. Although
there is a distinction between the terms "custom" and
"usage," they are commonly used interchangeably. "Usage
is habitual or customary practice," 3 while custom is such
usage which has by long and uniform practice become the
law of that to which it relates.4 The Restatement of Contracts
avoids reference to custom and discusses only the effect of
usage in the law of contracts. South Carolina cases seem to
manifest no great distinction between the two, and "custom"
is treated in them as synonymous with usage and not in the
sense of law arising from long usage.
1. Connor & Co. v. Robinson, 2 Hill 354 (S. C. 1834).
2. Ibid.
3. RESTATAEENT, CONTRACTS Sec. 245 (1933).
4. Williston, CONTRACTS Sec. 649 (1938).
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REQUISITES AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
"A usage to become law must be of long standing, general
in its operation, and known to, and acquiesced in by all those
whose rights are affected by it, besides being just and reason-
able in its operation." 5 Before persons are required to know
the customs and usages which constitute the law of their con-
tracts, those customs and usages should be plain and distinct,
ancient and certain,6 and must not violate any general rule
of law7 Singleton v. Hilliard8 quotes Lord Coke as saying that
the characteristics of a good custom are that it is "not sub-
ject to contention and dispute" and it has "continuity."
South Carolina cases have considered the element of rea-
sonableness in the alleged custom. Where a printer asserted
that it was a usage of the trade to insert advertisements in
the newspaper until expressly discontinued though in fact the
purpose of the advertisement had ceased, the usage was held
unreasonable.9 On the other hand, a custom in the shipping
trade which exempted the insured shipper from providing a
pilot, which by the general law of insurance he was to have
done, was established to be reasonable. The insured had no
duty to make the usages of the trade known in his offer be-
cause the underwriters were bound to know them. The rea-
sonableness of this custom "depended on proof of its general
use and its being established as a general custom."'10
A custom will be considered unreasonable if it is calculated
to operate unequally and fraudulently." Where a consignee
of goods gave a note to the seller, unindorsed by the pur-
chaser, and the purchaser pleaded that by custom he was thus
discharged and that only the maker of the note was liable, the
Court held the custom was unreasonable, although several
witnesses swore to its existence. The Court said that the
buyer owed the seller a debt, that from these facts the true
debtor should not be released and that a custom so unrea-
sonable should never supersede law.
12
5. Hayward v. Middleton, 3 McCord 121 (S. C. 1825).
6. Singleton v. Hilliard, 1 Strob. 203 (S. C. 1847).
7. Connor & Co. v. Robinson, 2 Hill 354 (S. C. 1334).
8. 1 Strob. 203 (S. C. 1847).
9. Thomas v. Graves, 1 Mill Const. 308 (S. C. 1817).
10. Cox, Maitland & Co. v. Charleston F. & M. Ins. Co., 3 Rich. 331
(S. C. 1831).
11. Connor & Co. v. Robinson, 2 Hill 354 (S. C. 1834).
12. Prescott v. Hubbell, 1 McCord 94 (S. C. 1821).
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Before a usage can be legally binding on one who does not
have actual knowledge of it, the usage must be shown to be
certain and uniform. In an action for damages for loss of
bales of cotton shipped on defendant's boat, the defendant
asserted a usage of carriers in the particular trade exempting
them from common law liability. Finding this custom to be
of recent origin and continually resisted in cases, the Court
said that a custom or usage, intended, as here, "to alter estab-
lished rules of law, must be of very long standing so as to
imply the general acquiescence of all parties."' 13
No usage or custom is allowed which is in conflict with the
law of the land. Usage might allow a factor commissions on
goods purchased and on advances, but it cannot allow interest
as well as commissions on the advances, which are really loans
of money, because that would savor of usury.' 4 Where the
defense of a man indicted for selling liquor to a slave was
that under his license the usage allowed him to do so, such
practice was held forbidden by an act of the Assembly, and
usage was no defense.' 5 In an action to recover for loss of
cotton waste evidence was excluded of a custom of the trade
that when waste was bought from a dealer and stored in his
warehouse, the dealer either insured it or notified the cus-
tomer that he did not have it insured. This custom was in
derogation of a warehouse receipt statute."6 The Court said
that when parties enter into a contract, "all laws of the state
that may relate to the subject matter of the contract are part
of that contract; custom and usage cannot take precedence
over the statutory law of the state."'
OPERATION AND EFFECT
In South Carolina custom and usage have been of primary
importance in the field of contractual relations. Evidence of
them has been received to add unexpressed terms to a written
agreement,' 8 to aid in its interpretation,'9 and to explain cer-
13. Singleton v. Hlliard, 1 Strob. 203 (S. C. 1847).
14. Smetz v. Kennedy, Riley 218 (S. C. 1837).
15. The State v. Nicholas Jarcke, Riley 296 (S. C. 1837).
16. CODE OF LAws oF SOUTH CARoLINA, 1952 Sec. 69-4.
17. Ayres v. Crowley, 205 S. C. 51, 30 S. E. 2d 785 (1943).
13. Burden v. Woodside Cotton Mills, 104 S. C. 435, 89 S. E. 474
(1916).
19. Southern Ry. Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors of America, 215 S. C.
280, 54 S. E. 2d 816 (1949), reversed Order of Ry. Conductors of Amer-
ica v. Southern Ry. Co., 339 U. S. 255 (1945).
422 [Vol. 10
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tain ambiguities of the language2" or terms21 used therein.
But evidence inconsistent with or contradictory of a contract
will not be allowed.2 2 The following subdivisions amplify
these general statements on the effect of custom and usage on
contracts.
I. Creation of the Contract
Evidence of custom is admissible to show whether the con-
tract ever came into existence. Where it was the established
custom in the cotton trade in a particular community for both
buyer and seller to confirm to each other in writing when a
sale was made by a broker, it was held that a contract was
not created because of lack of such confirmation.2 3
II. Adding to Terms of the Contract
Evidence of usage or custom may add unexpressed terms
to written contracts. The known usage of a trade, business
or calling are presumed to enter into and form a part of con-
tracts made with respect thereto,2 4 unless they are excluded
or modified by agreement.25 In an early case in Charleston,
a custom of the cotton trade was held binding on the sale,
which custom provided that the wharfinger weigh bags on
arrival and that contracts of sale be made with reference
thereto, unless there was an express stipulation for reweigh-
ing by the buyer.26 But as has been noted, a custom to be
binding, as a part of the lex contractum, must be general and
well understood. The parties must stipulate with a knowledge
of it.27 The rule is that such knowledge must be shown either
by evidence of personal knowledge or by evidence that the
custom is so notorious, general and well-established that
knowledge of it will be presumed. Where an addressee lived
outside the free delivery limit of a telegraph company, an
asserted custom that the company often delivered messages in
20. Mullins Lumber Co. v. Williamson & Brown Land & Lumber Co.,
246 F. 232 (4th Cir. 1917).
21. W. S. Forbes & Co. v. W. M. & 3. J. Pearson, 87 S. C. 67, 68 S. E.
964 (1909).
22. Albion Phosphate Min. Co. v. Wyllie, 77 F. 541 (4th Cir. 1896).
23. Johnson v. Fairmont Mills, 129 F. 74 (4th Cir. 1904), affirming
116 F. 537 (C. C. D. S. C. 1902).
24. Friedheim v. Walter H. Hildic Co., 104 S. C. 378, 89 S. E. 358
(1916).
25. Burden v. Woodside Cotton Mills, 104 S. C. 435, 89 S. E. 474
(1916).
26. Connor & Co. v. Robinson, 2 Hill 354 (S. C. 1834).
27. Smetz v. Kennedy, Riley 218 (S. C. 1837).
19581
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the neighborhood did not avail because it was not within
the knowledge of the parties to be affected. 28 On the other
hand, where an insurance company customarily notified its
policyholders of the due dates of premium notes, the holder
was held entitled to the benefit of such custom, in an action
to reinstate his policy, regardless of the provisions of the
premium note waiving notice of the due date to such holder.29
It is a question of fact for the jury whether the parties con-
tracted with reference to the specific custom of one of the
parties or a custom general in that business. If each had a
different custom in mind, no contract is formed.30
When a usage is expressly incorporated into the contract
the Courts will enforce it accordingly. Thus, in an 1838 case
involving a policy of insurance which referred to the laws
and usages of London and no other as the standard by which
liabilities on a vessel would be determined, the usage of Phila-
delphia, the port of destination, was of no effect.3 ' However,
a custom may be excluded by the terms of the contract. Where
a contract laid out the commissions to be paid to a consignee
and stated that there were no other agreements, verbal or
otherwise, the Court held that evidence to show a custom of
the trade as to payment of commissions was inadmissible.32
A custom can imply an agreement contrary to the settled
doctrine. Although interest is not allowed on an open account
in South Carolina unless there is an agreement to pay it,
such agreement may be implied from the usage of trade.3 3
However, in this situation it is emphasized that a custom of a
particular store cannot prevail unless it is expressly or im-
pliedly sanctioned by the party.3" Again, while the rule is
that a partner is not liable on the basis of implied authority
for the contracts of his copartner unless they are within the
scope of the business, usage may show the contract made by
28. Martin v. Telegraph Co., 81 S. C. 432, 62 S. E. 833 (1907).
29. Lane v. New York Life Ins. Co., 147 S. C. 333, 145 S. E. 196
(1925).
30. Burden v. Woodside Cotton Mills, 104 S. C. 435, 89 S. E. 474
(1916).
31. Union Bank of South Carolina v. Union Ins. Co., Dud. 171 (S. C.
1838).
32. Armour Fertilizer Works v. Hymen, 120 S. C. 375, 113 S. E. 330
(1922).
33. Knight v. Mitchell, 2 Tread. Const. 668 (S. C. 1814).
34. Searson v. Heyward & Co., I Speers 249 (S. C. 1843).
424 [Vol. 10
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one member to have been within the scope of such a business. 35
On the other hand, no usage will authorize a departure from
the positive instructions of principal to agent.30 In one case,
although custom indicated that a factor shipping goods was
liable for the wharfage, it was held that it could also be
recovered from the owner of the goods.
3 7
III. Explaining the Contract
Usages concerning the subject matter are admissible to
aid in construction of a written contract. In a comparatively
recent case where the question was whether certain switching
trips by a railroad entitled conductors to an extra day's pay,
35. Galloway v. Hughes, 1 Bailey 553 (S. C. 1830); Nichols v. Hughes,
2 Bailey 109 (S. C. 1831); Fleming, Ross & Co. v. Prescott, Bishop &
Gray, 3 Rich. 307 (S. C. 1832). "The resort to custom and usage to
establish the implication of authority is well illustrated in two cases, in
which the defendants were the same persons. In Galloway v. Hughes,
the defendants were partners engaged in transporting freight by boat
from points in the upper part of the state to Charleston. The plaintiff
dealt with one of the partners, delivering cotton to him to be hauled to
Charleston and sold. The partner sold the cotton but did not remit the
proceeds, and in this action to recover the money from the firm, there
was a denial that the partner selling had the authority to do so. The case
was decided principally on the ground that custom and usage indicated
the existence of the practice of selling for a shipper in the area involved,
and the partners were held liable. On the other hand, in Nichols v.
Hughes, where the plaintiff turned over iron to one partner to deliver
to a consignee and to collect for it, and the partner failed to pay over
the proceeds, it was held that there was no evidence of custom among
those engaged in the same kind of business to collect for a shipper on
a consignment of freight, and that the nonparticipating partner was not
liable. The decision in Galloway v. Hughes was held not to be controlling,
because of dissimilarity in the facts, and the presence there of a custom
not duplicated in this case.
"The role of local usage is pointed up in Flemming v. Prescott, which
was an action upon a note given in the firm name. The note, signed by
one of the partners, had been given in substitution of a draft previously
accepted by one of the members in the name of the firm for the accom-
modation of a third party. The defense was that there was no authority
to accept or endorse drafts for the use of third parties. The court held,
however, that according to the usage in Charleston, in which the trans-
action took place, it was the practice of business firms to accept and
endorse bills of exchange for accommodation, and that whatever the
custom might be elsewhere local usage controlled. The partners were,
therefore, held liable, although it was on the basis of actual assent of
all the partners that the case was principally decided.
"The three cases just discussed emphasize the part that custom and
usage play, and their authority on the general principle is hardly to be
questioned. The force of those cases as precedent, however, under similar
facts, is open to doubt, since a fresh inquiry would have to be made as
to custom-for as times change, so do customs." Karesh, Partnership
Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina, 3 S. C. L. Q.
193, p. 369 (1951).
36. Barksdale v. Brown & Tunis, 1 Nott. & MeC. 517 (S. C. 1815).
37. Thomas v. Graves, 1 Mill Const. 3088 (S. C. 1817).
1958]
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the United States Supreme Court held that evidence of prac-
tices which had prevailed over a number of years was admis-
sible to show the interpretation of the contract by the
parties.3 1
The place where the contract is made and is to be performed
controls what trade terms and customs are applied. Thus,
"ground sheep manure" was interpreted according to the
Charleston market and not Chicago, when the purchaser paid
the draft and received the bill of lading in South Carolina. 39
Where doubt arises as to the meaning of words used in a
contract, parol evidence may be admitted as to the signifi-
cance the words have according to the usage of those ac-
customed to make contracts of that particular kind,40 but
such evidence is not admissible when the meaning of the lan-
guage is plain.41 In a suit involving a deed containing the
description "down said creek to Little Pee Dee River," the
party was allowed to give proof of a certain and immemorial
usage that this meant to a swamp on the edge and not to the
run of the stream. The Court said evidence of common usage
of the locality must be plain and clear to give a meaning to
a word or expression different from its usual significance.
42
Besides common words and phrases, evidence of custom is also
admissible to explain particular or peculiar language of a
trade or profession. "Net sales" in one case was held, accord-
ing to the usage, to mean after deductions for freight and
jobbers' discount.
43
IV. Varying the Terms of the Contract
A group of cases has applied the limitation that, "Evi-
dence of custom and usage is not admissible to explain or
vary the terms of an express contract, whether written or
verbal, unambiguous in its terms, unless it be to show the
meaning of certain terms used in such contract, which by
well-established custom or long usage, have acquired a mean-
ing different from that which they primarily bear, for the
33. Southern Ry. Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors of America, supra
note 19.
39. Markey v. Brunson, 286 F. 893 (4th Cir. 1923).
40. Forbes & Co. v. Pearson, 87 S. C. 67, 68 S. E. 964 (1909).
41. Bailey v. Savannah Guano Co., 106 S. C. 50, 90 S. E. 317 (1916).
42. Mullins Lumber Co. v. Williamson & Brown Land & Lumber Co.,
246 F. 232 (4th Cir. 1917).
43. Friedheim v. Walter H. Hildic Co., 104 S. C. 378, 89 S. E. 358
(1916).
[Vol. -10
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reason that when parties in making a contract use terms which
through custom or usage have acquired a certain meaning,
they must, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
be assumed to have used such terms in such acquired sense."
44
A leading case involved a telegram to brokers in New York
instructing them to sell corn for future delivery and to "stop
loss 144." The seller contended that a usage of trade limited
the language in controversy to application only on the day
the instructions were sent. It was held, however, that evi-
dence of the usage was inadmissible because "the language
on the face of the wire is clear and unambiguous. 14 5 In an
earlier action the language of the contract specifically spelled
out the terms, among which were "seller paying brokerage
at 10 cents per ton." To a plea that a custom of the fertilizer
trade allowed brokerage only on such fertilizer as was actually
delivered on the contract, the Court said this was not a con-
tract of the character which would require or warrant a resort
to evidence of custom and usage in order to explain any am-
biguity therein, as there was none.40
Evidence of custom is not admissible to vary a special con-
tract between the parties. A merchant defended an action
for the purchase price of goods with the allegation that it was
customary among merchants to order by needles and not by
cards. The order blank had specific words "needle cards" in
front of which defendant inserted "5M." This written con-
tract was binding on the parties and was held to override
any custom. 47 A similar case involved an agreement whereby
a consignee was to be liable for loss incurred from his failure
to keep certain property "fully insured." His allegation that
among insurance companies full insurable value is customarily
interpreted to be 3/4ths of actual value, was held incapable
of contradicting this "unambiguous and unequivocal agree-
ment.,
48
An unambiguous contract of employment cannot be varied
or explained by evidence of custom and usage. Where the
44. Alexas v. Post & Flagg, 129 S. C. 53, 123 S. E. 769, 35 A. L. R. 969
(1924).
45. Ibid.
46. Fairly v. Wappoo Mills, 44 S. C. 227, 22 S. E. 108, 29 L. R. A. 215
(1894).
47. Coates & Sons v. Early, 46 S. C. 220, 24 S. E. 305 (1896).
48. Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co. v. People's Supply Co., 77 S. C. 92, 57
S. E. 676 (1905).
19581
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commission for selling certain commodities was fixed by the
agreement, that special contract was binding.49 A contract
between a deceased employee and the Brotherhood of Railway
Carmen of America stated that a blue flag would be put
out when a workman was under a car. No evidence could be
offered as to a custom that workmen themselves placed the
blue flag. 0 In a very recent case a broker who held the pur-
chaser's earnest money under a land purchase contract on
which the purchaser subsequently defaulted was held not en-
titled to retain one-half of the earnest money in accordance
with the purported locai custom. The Court said, "The custom
was proved but the law, by the weight of authority, is to the
contrary, in the absence of controlling contract provision."5 1
ESTABLISHMENT
The general usages of trade form a part of the law of the
land, and are presumed to be known by all, and are the tests
of all contracts arising under them. When the custom has
been settled by solemn adjudications or where the usage is
known to everyone and leaves no doubt in the minds of a
court or jury, proof will not be admissible.5 2 Thus, those
customs which have been included as part of the common law
are subject of general notice without proof in point of fact;
however, usages of business do not as a general rule lie within
the notice of the court. In a case involving the meaning of
certain language in a charter to a railroad company, this
principle was applied. A different rate applied to "heavy
articles" than to "articles of admeasurement," and the ques-
tion was to which group bales of cotton belonged. It was held
that the terms could not be defined by mere legal authority,
but that testimony was necessary of the custom or habit of
business tending to define their import by those in the busi-
ness of transportation by rail.
53
When the action is on a claim founded on general or local
custom, it must be pleaded ;54 on the other hand, it is not nec-
49. Autrey v. Bell, 114 S. C. 370, 103 S. E. 749 (1919).
50. Cato v. Atlantic & C. A. L. Ry. Co., 164 S. C. 123, 162 S. E. 239
(1931).
51. Thomas v. Jeffcoat, 230 S. C. 126, 94 S. E. 2d 240 (1956).
52. Thomas v. O'Hara, 1 Mill Const. 303 (S. C. 1817).
53. Bonham v. C. C. & A. Ry. Co., 13 S. C. 267 (1879); Elder & Co.
v. C. C. & A. Ry. Co., 13 S. C. 279 (1879).
54. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Charles E. Gibson, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 857
(E. D. S. C. 1938).
[Vol. 10
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essary to plead a private custom for evidence to be admis-
sible.55
As already stated, the general rule is that evidence of cus-
tom is not admissible when the meaning of the language of a
contract is clear.55" The Supreme Court declined to reverse
a circuit judge who admitted evidence on the ground that he
himself did not understand the meaning of the terms used.58
Establishing a custom to be general57 requires many wit-
nesses.5" In a recent case the Court would not rely on evi-
dence by the plaintiff purporting to establish a custom that
the undefined term "occupancy" in leases of textile plants
meant occupancy for manufacturing operations and not entry
merely to prepare the property for such use. The evidence
offered by the plaintiff relating to his experience with the
term did not show its use to have been general, either in
New England where he had been doing business, or in South
Carolina where the textile plant was situated, or that it was
of such uniformity and duration as to charge the defendant
with knowledge.59 In another case evidence of a business
usage was held insufficient when given by only a few mer-
chants.60 However, a witness who qualifies as an expert may
testify as to the general custom of trade.61 The ultimate de-
cision as to the existence of a custom is a question of fact for
the jury.
62
CONCLUSION
Although custom and usage have been a vital force in cre-
ating legal principles, today the judicial process has tempered
their importance. In the words of Judge Cardozo, "In these
days ... we look to custom, not so much for creation of new
rules but for tests and standards that are to determine how
established rules shall be applied." 63 In South Carolina the
55. A. M. Law & Co. v. Cleveland, 172 S. C. 200, 173 S. E. 638 (1934).
55a. Etiwan Fertilizer Co. v. Johns, 208 S. C. 428, 38 S. E. 2d 387
(1946).
56. Forbes & Co. v. Pearson, 87 S. C. 67, 68 S. E. 964 (1909).
57. Chastain v. Bowman, 1 Hill 270 (S. C. 1833).
58. Thomas v. Graves, 1 Mill Const. 308 (S. C. 1817).
59. Kayser & Co. v. Textron, 228 F. 2d 783 (4th Cir. 1956).
60. Hayward v. Middleton, 3 McCord 121 (S. C. 1825).
61. Rhodus v. Dukes, 128 S. C. 354, 122 S. E. 872 (1923).
62. Carolina Nat. Bank v. Wallace, 13 S. C. 347 (1880).
63. Cardozo, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921), p. 60.
429
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majority of cases on custom and usage arose during the 19th
century, and only a handful during the last twenty years.
There seems to be no serious conflict in these decisions; the
individual factual situation appears to control.
In an early case it was said that to make a custom binding,
three things only are necessary: first, that it should be gen-
eral, so ruch so as to be generally known to those conversant
with the particular trade; second, it should be reasonable; and
third, it must not violate any general rule of law. 4 With re-
gard to the effect of custom and usage on contracts, it may
be said that in general the parol evidence rule prevails -
that evidence of parol testimony cannot be received to con-
tradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid
written instrument; but if there is any ambiguity on the
face of the contract, evidence of custom and usage will be
admitted to ascertain the intention of the parties. Further-
more, parol evidence of the meaning according to the usages
of trade is admissible to explain technical terms and abbrevi-
ations in a written memorandum required under the Statute
of Frauds. 0 Thus, in effect, evidence of custom and usage
may make an otherwise indefinite contract enforceable and
valid.
VIRGINIA A. GASTON.
64. Connor & Co. v. Robinson, 2 Hill 354 (S. C. 1834).
65. Pitts v. Edwards, 141 S. C. 126, 139 S. E. 219 (1925). Note, this
case doesn't specifically mention "custom and usage"; however, it holds
that parol evidence is admissible to explain technical terms in a written
memorandum.
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